

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM: <div>EE/G/L</div> <div>Ext. 528/2451</div>				COMMENTS	
TO		ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED FORWARDED		OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/EE/G					<div>HB</div>
2.					
3. EE/P					
4.					
5. DC/EE/COP/W/ <div></div>					<div>uf</div>
6.					
7. EE/G/L/BLP					<div>blp</div>
8.					
9.					
10. RI/CRO					<div>ku</div>
11.					
12. RI/DP					
13.					
14.					
15.					
16.					
17.					
18.					

COORDINATE

copy attached

COORDINATE

DESENSITIZED

RECORDED COPY

DESENSITIZED

6 AUG 1959

6 AUG 1959

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2000 2006

AN

Shob

AB

X

IN

PS

EX

DES NFD

FI

Hyd

DESENSITIZED

COORDINATING OFFICERS			AUTHENTICATING OFFICER	
NAME		OFFICE	NAME	TITLE
<div></div>		<div>EE/P</div> <div>DC/EE/COP/W</div>		
			RELEASING OFFICER	
				TITLE
				C/EE/G/L
ENCLOSURE	ABSTRACT	INDEX	FILE NUMBER	DOCUMENT DATE
DATE MICROFILMED			DOCUMENT NUMBER	
			X EGMW 8131	

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
TO INFO Chief Munich Base, Attn: Liaison Branch Chief of Station, Germany		SECRET DESENSITIZED	EGMW 8131
FROM Chief, EE			HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 328-6-181/1
SUBJECT Q Operational/CART/CAMEDIUM/UJNUTLET/UPSWING Alleged KGB Query on CALETHAL through UJNUTLET		DATE 359	
ACTION REQUIRED See para 3		RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)	
REFERENCE(S) MUNI 5502, 22 July 1959		MARKED FOR INDEXING	
		NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY	
<p>1. We found alias FRIESEN's statement that the KGB had instructed UJNUTLET via OWVL to determine whether prior to his defection CALETHAL had been an UPSWING or CAVATA agent to be very interesting. The following thoughts occurred to us.</p> <p>2. Unless UJNUTLET has grossly overstated his UPSWING connections to the KGB, it is strange the KGB seems to think UJNUTLET might have access to the requested information. If the KGB actually asked the question, this could be an indication the KGB knows UJNUTLET has been turned by UPSWING, and calculates UPSWING will supply a true answer as build-up material.</p> <p>3. On the other hand, in the context of CAMEDIUM we should consider the possibility that the KGB asked not UJNUTLET but alias FRIESEN to determine which German agency, or more likely, which American agency ran CALETHAL prior to defection. Whether this is the case or not, it occurs to us that one seldom gets such a built-in opportunity to feed a reply to a prime suspect on the chance it may echo. You might, for instance, wonder aloud to alias FRIESEN why the KGB did not also ask whether the Americans had run CALETHAL, since the fact the Americans are returning him to Berlin for interrogation probably has not escaped KGB notice. The KGB might well have assumed, you could point out, that largely by chance CALETHAL got into the wrong (West German) channels and was left there temporarily by the Americans out of embarrassment that CALETHAL, though not previously surfaced to the West Germans was largely knowledgeable on matters of West German interest. If, as might be anticipated, alias FRIESEN then inquires whether this was indeed the case, you could somewhat anxiously assure him you were merely wondering why the KGB missed the theoretical possibility, -- which speculation you would of course not want to be suggested in any way in UJNUTLET's answer. A return of any part of this little exchange in identifiable form from hostile sources would be most interesting.</p> <p>4. The possibility also occurs to us that alias FRIESEN's offering may have quite another significance. Apparently CAVATA and UPSWING have not coordinated too well on CALETHAL, as is indicated in BOMM 8815 and similar traffic. It is somewhat more than probable that UPSWING does not know all the details concerning the basis for CAVATA's turnover to the Americans of a source whose information is mainly of German interest. Though the logic and indeed necessity of such a turnover and return to Berlin may be entirely evident to us, the basis of this position might well appear in German eyes to be at best undue reliance upon legal niceties, unless some other cogent factors were involved. Being imperfectly informed, or not crediting the reasons, UPSWING may think the Americans are so insistent because they ran CALETHAL, and are unlikely to admit it except possibly in reply to a provocative approach, which has now been tried through FRIESEN's statement. On reflection, we think this reasoning is scarcely strained from the German point of view, and is in fact perhaps supported by alias REIMER's careful request for traces on CALETHAL operational leads (MUNI 5533). We know alias REIMER is a congenial guy, but still his stated anxiety in this case to "avoid interservice quibbling re which service entitled exploit leads" is scarcely consistent with his known impatience to get on with ops against the Mfs.</p> <p>5. Incidentally, bearing on the general matter of the genuineness of the statement FRIESEN has volunteered, is the question of why the KGB rather than the Mfs is making the inquiry.</p> <p>6. Finally, we believe FRIESEN's recent reference to UJNUTLET is a perfectly good basis for a direct request that FRIESEN provide information on the UJNUTLET OWVL,</p>			
FORM 10-57 53 (40)		USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET DESENSITIZED
		PAGE NO.	

SECRET

CONTINUATION OF
DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.

ECOM 8131

SECRET
DESENSITIZED

including the signal plan and cipher. We realize you will probably get only a reasonably polite no, but FRIESEN could hardly consider the request outrageous. After all, we know the identity of the agent and it is obvious we are not going to horn in on the direction of the case. We would hardly endanger security by listening in to gain know-how on Soviet OWL, and in the final analysis, the requested details really amount to a form of CE product of extreme interest.

Distribution:

2 - MB/LB
2 - COS/G

3 August 1959

1 - RE/G/IS (DUMMY)

1 - EE/P

2 - EE/G/L

blp

signature

SECRET

SECRET
DESENSITIZED